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ARTICLES 
CONFRONTATION AS REJOINDER TO 
COMPROMISE: REFLECTIONS ON THE 
LITTLE ROCK DESEGREGATION CRISIS* 
Raymond T. Diamond** 
In September 1957, soldiers of the IOI st Airborne Division of the United 
States Army were called to duty i n  hostile territory. These soldiers were 
called to Little Rock, Arkansas, to keep safe nine Black children who, under a 
court order of desegregation, attended Little Rock's Central High School. 1 
The Little Rock crisis is writ large in the history of the desegregation of 
the American South. Because many of the events of the crisis were performed 
before the television camera at a time when television was new, the Little 
Rock crisis was etched graphically in the American consciousness. 2 The cam­
era showed in violent detail the will ingness of the South to maintain segrega­
tion, and the willingness of the federal government to support federal law. 
Many books have been published regarding the Little Rock crisis. Daisy 
Bates wrote The Long Shadow of Little Rock, A Memoir from her perspective 
as a leader of the Arkansas branch of the National Association for the Ad­
vancement of Colored People (NAACP).3 Brooks Hays4 and Orval Faubus5 
have provided the perspective of elected officials who influenced the event of 
Little Rock. Virgil Blossom wrote as a superintendent of schools who at­
tempted to implement a "go slow" desegregation plan which would recognize 
the mandate of Brown v. Board of Education 6 but still take advantage of the 
* The ideas in Part III of this essay were presented in earlier form a t  the July 1987 annual 
meeting of the American Association of L a w  Librarians, and comments there received are 
acknowledged. 
** Assistant Professor, Louisiana State U niversity Law Center. B.A. 1973, J.D. 1977 Yale Uni­
versity. The author acknowledges also the research assistance of Michael Colvin, J.D., L.S.U. 1986; 
Brett Beyer III, J.D., L.S.U. 1987; and Karen Hayne, L.S.U. Class of 1989. 
I. Exec. Order No. 10,730, Sept. 24, 1957, 2 2  F.R. 7628 (1957). D. Eisenhower, Radio and 
Television Address to the American People on the Situation in Little Rock, 1957 PUBLIC PAPERS OF 
THE PRESIDENTS: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 689 (1957) (hereinafter cited as 1957 PUBLIC PA­
PERS). See also Proclamation 3,204, Sept. 24, 1957, 22 F.R. 7628 (1957) . 
. 2. The power of these television images is presented in "Fighting Back (1957-62)," Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years, 1954-65 (PBS television broadcast, January 28, 1986) (videotape 
available through PBS Adult Learning Services). See also J. WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE -
AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-1965 (1987) (hereinafter cited as EYES ON THE PRIZE). 
3. 0. BATES, THE LONG SHADOW Of LITTLE ROCK, A MEMOIR (1982). 
4. B. HAYS, POLITICS IS MY PARISH, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1981), and B. HAYS, A SOUTH­
ERN MODERATE SPEAKS (1959). Hays was a member of Congress who lost his seat because he 
counseled moderation. 
5. 0. FAUBUS, DOWN FROM THE HILLS ( 1980). Faubus was a governor who pioneered what 
came to be known as massive resistance. 
[ . . 6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (hereinafter cited as Brown[). Brown I declared "(s]eparate educational ac1ht1es are inherently unequal." Brown I at 347 U.S. 494. 
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weaknesses of Brown's implementation formula,7 and who was frustrated from 
even this minimal attempt.8 Elizabeth Huckaby's Crisis at Central High is the 
account of an assistant principal at Central High during the critical period, an 
eyewitness account of what happened not just outside the schoolhouse gates 
but also what happened behind the schoolhouse's closed doors.9 
None of these authors have attempted to explain the Little Rock crisis in 
constitutional terms. Content to describe events and explain them as they un­
derstood them, these authors have the gift and the limitation of personal per­
spective. Not even Tony Preyer's The Little Rock Crisis A Constitutional 
Interpretation, 10 written from the perspective of an objective observer, fully 
explains the constitutional significance of Little Rock. Instead it performs the 
same descriptive task as the participants in this crisis, but paints a more global 
picture. 
This Article speaks to this lacuna in our understanding of the events of 
Little Rock. The remainder of this Article is divided into four parts. Part I 
describes the events of the Little Rock crisis. Part II suggests the implications 
of Brown v. Board's implementation formula as a factor contributing to the 
character and the severity of the Little Rock crisis. Part III examines the 
constitutional basis of interposition and the concept of localism as a justifica­
tion for resistance in Little Rock. 
The concluding section speaks to the question which the Little Rock cri­
sis begged and which was answered by the Supreme Court in Cooper v. 
Aaron, 11 whether the pronouncements of the Supreme Court deserve recogni­
tion as the law of the land. 
I. PEOPLE AND EVENTS 
The seeds of the crisis in Little Rock were planted the day after Brown v. 
7. Desegregation was to take place not immediately but "with all deliberate speed" 349 U.S. 
294, 300 (1955) (hereinafter cited as Brown II) and .. as soon as practicable" Id. at 299. 
8. V. BLOSSOM, IT HAS HAPPENED HERE (1959). 
9. E. HUCKABY, CRISIS AT CENTRAL HIGH (1980). 
10. T. FREYER, THE LITTLE ROCK CRISIS: A CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1984). The 
subtitle is deceiving. THE LITTLE ROCK CRISIS is not a constitutional interpretation, instead a ren­
dering of the facts and their political/sociological explanations. Freyer's intent was to .. approach the 
integration conflict in terms of the interplay of local politics and judicial process." Id. at ix. He 
explores through the hiswry of the Little Rock crisis "the relationship between change imposed 
through law and that achieved through moral principle." Id. at 4. Though THE LITTLE ROCK 
CRISIS performs the same task as have the works of the participants who have written on the crisis, it 
not only benefits from a more global perspective, but it is a book with more factual depth, having the 
benefit of access t o  records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, private records of the National 
Assoc1at1on for the Advancement of Colored People and private legal files. Jd. at ix. I. SPITZBERG, 
JR., RACIAL POLITICS IN .
LITTLE ROCK, 1954-1967 (1987), covers the crisis as part of a more exten­
st1ve llme. period of examination. Other non-participants have published on the subject of the Little 
Rock cns1s but have not had the benefit of Freyer's sources. See, e.g., c. SILVERMAN, THE LITTLE 
ROCK STORY. Add!l1onally they have attempted to view Little Rock not a s  an isolated topic of a 
rnaJ
·
O� work but hav� w ntten �hapters on Llltle Rock in books on larger topics. See, e.g., N. BAR­
I LE), THE R ISE Of MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE S OUTH DURING THE l 950's (1969); E. JACOWBY and 0. COLBURN, SOUTHERN BUSINESSMEN AND DESEGREGATION (19.82); A. BICKEi.,
. 
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); J. PELTASON, FIFTY EIGHT LONELY 
MEN (1961): F. R1 .. AD, L. MCGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED (1978)· 0. HANDLIN FIRE BELL IN 
THE NIGHT ( 1964 ): bur cf. ARKANSAS GAZETTE, CRISIS IN THE SouT� : THE LITT:E ROCK STORY (1958); H. ALEXANDER. THE LITTLE ROCK RECALL ELECTION (1960) 11. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). . 
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Board 12 was rendered in 1954. On May 17, 1954, Brown I, as it later was 
called, laid to rest the constitut ional doctrine of "separate but equal," recog­
nized by Plessy v. Ferguson, 11 declaring instead that "[s]eparate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal." 14 On May 18th, the Little Rock school 
board instructed its superintendent, Virgil Blossom, "to develop a plan consis­
tent with the Court's order," and by the end of the month school officials had 
issued a public statement committing Little Rock to desegregation.15 
By fall of 1954, Superintendent Blossom had formed a plan under which 
desegregation would begin almost immediately, in two high schools as soon as 
construction reached completion by 1956, and in junior high schools by 
1957.16 For several months, Blossom promoted the plan before the academic 
community and the public at large. 17 
In May of 1955, however, the school board approved a second and less 
ambitious plan. It limited desegregation to but one high school, Central High 
School, to the extent of allowing entrance to "only a handful of black chil­
dren."18 The plan would not desegregate junior high and elementary schools 
until years later. 19 This, the school board and its superintendent explained, 
was "consistent with an absolute minimum of what the law required."20 
Little Roc k ' s grudging willingness to desegregate its schools went hand in 
hand with the Supreme Court's second decision bearing the name Brown v. 
Board of Education.21 Brown II, decided May 31, 1955, provided that district 
courts imple menting desegregation need not order immediate and full desegre­
gation, but should take cognizanc e  of local conditions. Desegregation, the 
Court said, should take place not immediately but "with all deliberate 
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
13. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
14. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494. 
15. FREYER, supra note 10, at 15. 
16. Id. at 16. The overall outlines of the plan were extensive: 
In the eastern part of the city a new all-black junior high school was being built. Ac­
cording to the Blossom Plan, this would instead become an integrated high school (subse­
quently named Horace Mann High School), and Dunbar, the existing black high school, 
would become a junior high whose student body would remain black. A second high school 
(subsequently called Hall High School) was under construction in the western part of Little 
Rock; it, too, would be integrated on completion, probably in September 1956. The next 
year the junior high schools would be integrated. The date for integration of the elementary 
schools was left u nclear, but Blossom expected the process to occur more slowly. Finally, 
the board would outline several school attendance zones throughout the city. Assignment 
of students to these zones was to be made without regard to race. For several months, 
Blossom promoted his plan before various white business organizations and Black and 
White parent groups. 
Note that this plan did not desegregate existing high schools, that the details of junior high 
desegregation were left unspecified, and that the date of desegregation for elementary school was 
nebulous and that actual desegregation for these was expected to move even more slowly. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 16, 17.  
l 9. A second phase would open the junior high schools of a few blacks by 1960. No specific 
date for integration of the elementary schools was set, but the fall of 1963 was considered a 
strong possibility. Children would be allowed to transfer out of districts where their race 
was in a minority, which virtually assured that Horace Mann High, when opened. would lie 
all Black. Finally, the Phase Program provided for a selective screening process that mad,· it 
certain that only a small number of black children would attend Central. 
Id. at 17. 
20. Id. 
21. 349 u .s. 294 ( 1955). 
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speed."22 The state of Arkansas in its amicus brief filed November 15, 1954 in 
Brown J/23 had supported this position. 24 Between fall 1954 and May 1955 
the Little Rock School board revised its plan "along lines remarkably consis­
tent" with the state's brief.25 In effect, when the Supreme Court issued the 
opinion in Brown II, "it therefore indirectly sanctioned the [new] Blossom 
Plan."26 
After a period of internal dissension within the local branch of the Na­
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the 
Little Rock Black community,27 the NAACP, in order to force the pace of 
desegregation in Little Rock,28 filed suit in February 1956 on behalf of thirty­
three children not allowed to register at White schools. This request was re­
jected by the federal courts, 29 but not before the matter of school desegrega­
tion became an issue in the 1956 Arkansas gubernatorial campaign. 
Orval Faubus had taken office as governor of Arkansas in 1955, 30 but 
because of a two-year term of office, campaigning was a constant, though not 
always formal activity. In September 195 5, Faubus was warned that a refusal 
to actively support school segregation would lead to opposition in the 1956 
race; Faubus' position that whatever he might do "might only aggravate the 
situation" was not acceptable.31 Indeed, Faubus drew opposition based on the 
segregation issue in the 1956 campaign, in which he was accused of " 'pussy­
footing' on the integration question and ... wait[ing] for sentiment to develop 
before taking a stand . "32 
22. Id. at 300. 
23. Amicus Brief of the Attorney General of Arkansas, Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 
294 (1955) reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 831 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Amicus Brief]. 
24. Id. at 7-13. 
25. FREYER, supra note 10, at 35. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 42-45. 
28. FREYER, supra note 10, at 45. The NAACP's reasoning was this: 
Our objective is to secure the prompt and orderly end of segregation in the public schools. 
We want a�I children, regardless of race, to have the opportunity to go to the public schools 
nearest their homes. We seek an end to the hazards inconveniences and discrimination of a 
system which now requires little children to pass e;ch day several schools from which they 
are barred because .of race and. to travel nearly 10 miles to racially designated schools .... We are unw11lmg to connive by continued silence at such blows against the welfare of 
our young people, and so we have entered this suit. 
The school b�ard has announced what it calls a "three-phase" plan for desegregation . 
It has, however •
. 
given no fixed dates for integration at any level and not even the vaguest 
target dates for integration at the elementary and junior high level. Meanwhile, it proposes 
to allow young children to endure indefinitely unnecessary hazards of needless daily travel. 
Its policy continues to exclude "legro boys from the training necessary for many important 
trades m technical fields. School authorities have refused relief even on these points and 
have th.us dnven us to ask the courts for needed relief for the children now in school. 
Interview w11h J. C. C renchaw, president of the Little Rock NAACP, as reported by the Arkansas 
Democrat, February 8, 1956, at 1, as excerpted in W. RECORD & J. RECORD LITTLE ROCK U.S.A. 12 (1960). ' 
29 . . Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. A r k  1956), aff'd 243 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1957). A 
desrnptlOn of, t
.
he tnal and mitial decision in Aaron may be found in FREYER, supra note 10, at 54-59. 3� .. FRE\ l:R'. su�ra n�te 10, at 23; FAUBUS, DOWN FROM THE HILLS, supra note 5, at 72-74; 11 
�:�t Wuo IN 1 HE Sou fH AND SOUTHWEST 1969- 70, at 325 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Wtto's 
.�I. FREYER, supra note 10, at 65. 
32. Southern School News, August 1956, at 3, reprinted in w. RECORD & J. RECORD supra note l8, at !9. Faubus mamtamed that "segregation was a minor issue because all the candidates agreed 
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In particular, segregation was brought to the fore by the candidacy of 
James Johnson, a former state senator who in 1954 had lost a statewide race 
for attorney general, and who had found in segregation a new and popular 
issue.33 Johnson had gained some notoriety in opposing desegregation of 
schools in Hoxie. Arkansas, a tiny town which had sought to voluntarily de­
segregate its schools - because "it was 'right in the sight of God,' necessary 
because of the Brmvn decisions, a n d  'cheaper' "·�4 - only to be opposed by a 
statewide, even interstate network of segregationists who threatened violence, 
intimidated members of the school board and parents of Black children, and 
engenderd a boycott of Hoxie schools. 35 A federal injunction put a stop to the 
op position, 3<> but the opposition had already reaped a significant result in the 
prominence of the name of James Johnson as a vigorous and imaginative 
segregationist. 37 
Johnson became convinced of the sense of the doctrine of interpostion; 
the state, he thought, could and should interpose itself between the federal 
courts and the people of the state on the issue of segregation. 38 He proposed 
in late 1955 three  measures meant to forestall desegregation. The first was a 
state constitutional amendment directing the legislature to "take appropriate 
action" to evad e  the Brown decisions. The second was an act meant to effectu­
ate pupil assignment on grounds other than race. The third was a resolution 
of interposition placing the state on record against desegregation.39 These 
measures met with success in the November 1956 election, but Johnson's can­
didacy, which the measures, in part, were meant to foster, did not.40 
Governor Faubus had understood the need to position himself in favor of 
segregation, 41 and had understood that as the perceived segregationist candi­
date, Johnson was the candidate to beat. 42 As a result, Faubus jumped on the 
interposition bandwagon and, turning the issue to good advantage, won in a 
landslide.43 Faubus' position had implications, however, that in Little Rock 
proved critical. 
When the Arkansas legislature met in February 1957, it passed several 
statutes meant to maintain school segregation, and Governor Faubus felt con­
strained to support them.44 This put Faubus and the legislature at odds with 
on the subject," but  promised there would be "no breakdown of the state's traditional segregation 
pattern." Id. 
33. FREYER, supra note 10, at 68. Southern School News August 1956, at 3, reprinted in W. 
RECORD & J. RECORD, supra note 28, at 19. 
34. FREYER, supra note 10, at 64. 
35. Hoxie School District No. 46 v. Brewer, 135 F. Supp. 296, (E.D. Ark. 1955). Order for 
Injunction printed in 1 RACE REL. LAW REP. 43, 45 (1956). 
36. Id. See F reyer's discussion of the Hoxie incident at 63-68. 
37. FREYER, supra note 10, at 68. 
38. Id. at 70. 
39. Id. at 70-71, 79-80, 87-88. Southern School News December 1956, at 8, reprinted in W. 
RECORD & J. RECORD, supra note 28, at 27. 
40. Southern School News, December 1956, at 8, reprinted in W. RECORD & J. R ECORD, supra 
note 28, at 26. FREYER, supra note 10, at 81. 
41. FREYER, supra note 10, at 75. 
42. Id. at 78. 
43. Id. at 81; FAUBUS DOWN FROM THE HILLS, supra note 5, at 141. 
44. Once interposition formally became p a rt of the state's law in November'. legislators in the upcoming session of 1957 were bound to consider a number of segr�gat10n measures. One such proposal (a result of Amendment 4 7) would create a state sovereignty comm1ss10n 
with extensive investigative and police powers. Newly elected state attorney general Bruce 
156 
NATIONAL BLACK LAW JOURNAL 
the school board and the people of Little Rock, who in March 1957 elected . . 45 
two moderates to the school board over two segregatiomsts. Faubus' posi-
tion was in concert with the band of segregationists wh� ha� obstructed deseg­
regation in Hoxie and who now sought to do the same m Little Rock. As the 
spring and summer wore on this opposition caused concern to the school 
board, who were determined to let their plan go forward.46 
In late August of 1957, the situation grew tense. On August 22nd, Gov­
ernor Marvin Griffin of Georgia, a guest of Governor Faubus a t  the Arkansas 
governor's mansion in Little Rock, delivered a rabble-rousing segregationist 
speech. Faubus claimed that the speech changed citizen perception of deseg­
regation, such that now the governor feared violence at Central High.47 
Whether violence was an honest concern of Faubus is not clear. Two days 
before Griffin's speech, Faubus had talked with a United States Justice De­
partment official about the subject,48 and o n  August 29th in a state court pro­
ceeding he had instigated to enjoin the school board from desegregating 
Central High School, 49 Faubus testified to his fear of violence. 50 On neither of 
these occasions did Faubus state the b asis for his concern. 51 Moreover, 
Faubus' concern was belied in the state court proceeding by t h e  testimony of 
Superintendent Blossom that he had no expectation of trouble, 52 and by the 
later finding of a federal district court that until September 2nd "no acts of 
violence or threats of violence in connection with the carrying out of the plan 
had occurred. "53 Nonetheless, as a result of Faubus' testimony, a state judge 
on August 22nd granted an injunction against the September 3 desegregation, 
an injunction which itself was enjoined by a federal judge on August 30th.54 
Bennett sponsored other legislation requiring supporters of desegregation, particularly local 
NAACP branches, to register and make public reports of their activities. And, finally, Gov­
ernor Faubus pushed for his own enactments: one to relieve school children of compulsory 
attendance in racially mixed school districts, the other to authorize school districts to hire 
legal counsel to defend school boards and school officials in suits involving desegregation. 
Although he .ha.d not sponsored them, Faubus publicly supported the Bennett and sover­eignty comm1ss1on measures, despite their doubtful constitutionality and threat to civil 
liberties. 
FREYER, supra note 1 0, at 88-89 (footnotes omitted). 
45. Id. at 92. 
46. Id. at 93-98. The influence of the federal government on the positions of Faubus and of the 
board was minimal. 
Presi
.
dent Eise�hower had prnvided little direct public support for desegregation in general, 
and .m a public statement m July 1957 he said that use of federal forces t o  enforce the 
prm1c1ple was un
,
likely. Neither the president nor the Justice Department resisted Gover­
nor Allan Shiver s use of Rangers to reestablish segregation in several Texas communities 
a'.ter
. 
desegregation had resulted in disorder!� crowds. Division in the president's cabinet had also prevented vigorous executive. lobbying for a new civil rights bill, which enabled southern congressional leaders to s1gmficantly weaken the measure during the summer of 1957. 
FREYl'R, supra note 10, at 98-99 (footnotes omitted). 
47. Id. at 100-01. 
48. Id. at IOI. 
49. Id. 
SO. Id. at 102. 
51. Id. at 101-02. 
chie
�
-
2;
es
/d��t d0?· tv,tor�over, whe
.
n asked about Governor Faubus' statement, Little Rock's police 
N
, . .  
S
. po 
�
' 
,
;�\s say I hav.en t heard what Governor Faubus says he hears." Southern School c\\ s eptem er ' at 6 reprinted in W. RECORD & J. RECORD supra note 28 at 31 34. 53. Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F .  Supp. 220, 225 (E.D. Ark 1957).' ' - ' 54. Aaron v. Cooper, (E.D. Ark. Civ. No. 3113 August 30, 1957), reprillled in 2 RACE REL. 
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In spite of this loss in federa l  court, Governor Faubus on September 2nd 
issued a proclamation calling out the Arkansas National Guard,55 and ex­
plained that because of an "imminent danger of tumult, riot and breach of 
peace and the doing of violence to persons and property,"56 he had charged 
the Guard to prevent, "for the time being," desegregation at Central High 
School. 57 
On September 3rd, the school board petitioned the federal district court 
for instructions, 58 and the court ordered implementation of the plan "immedi­
ately and without delay."59 The following day, the National Guardsmen none­
theless blocked the entrance of the nine Black students, and pictures and 
reports of the abuse of one student appeared around the nation and the 
world. 60 That same day, Governor Faubus telegramed President Eisenhower, 
disclaiming any interest in "integration vs. segregation," and claimed that the 
LAW REP. 9 34 (I 957). FREYER, supra note 10, at 102. Southern School News September 1957, at 6, 
reprinred in W. RECOR D  & J. RECORD, supra note 28, at 33, 34. 
55. 0. Faubus, Proclamation, Sept. 2, 1957, reprinted in 2 RACE REL. LAW REP. 937. 
56. Id. 
57. 0. Faubus, Television Address, September 2, 1957, reprinted in W. RECORD & J. RECORD, 
supra noce 28, at 3 7. 
58. Petition of William G. Cooper et al., Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Ark. 1957) 
reprinted in 2 RACE REL. LAW REP. 937. 
59. Order. A aron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Ark. 1957) reprinted in 2 RACE REL LAW 
REP. 938, 939. 
60. FREYER, supra note 10, at 104 and sources cited therein, at I 14, 68. EYES ON THE PRIZE, 
supra noce 9, ac IO I, 102. The simple word "abuse" does not fully describe the ordeal suffered by the 
student. Elizabeth Eckford: 
Getting off the bus near Central High, Eckford saw a throng of white people and hun­
dreds of armed soldiers. But the presence of the guardsmen reassured her. The superinten­
dent had told the black students to come in  through the main entrance at the front of the 
school, so Elizabeth headed in that direction. "I looked at all the people and thought, 
'Maybe I 'll be safe if I walk down the block to the front entrance behind the guards,'" she 
r�members. "At the corner I tried to pass through the long lines of guards around the 
school so as to enter the grounds behind them. One [soldier] pointed across the street ... so 
I walked across the street conscious of the crowd that stood there, but they moved away 
from me ... [Then] the crowd began to follow me, calling me names. I still wasn't afraid -
.1us1 a little bit nervous. Then my knees started to shake all of a sudden and I wondered 
whether I could make it to the center entrance a block away. It was the longest block I ever 
walked in my whole life. Even so, I wasn't too scared, because all the time I kept thinking 
1h,· [guards] would protect me. 
"When I got in front of the school, I went up to a guard again," she continues. "He 
ju,l looked straight ahead and didn't move to let me pass. I didn't know what to do ... Just 
then the guards let some white students through ... I walked up to the guard who had let 
[lhemj in. He too didn't move. When I tried to squeeze past him, he raised his bayonet, 
and lhrn the o ther guards moved in and raised their bayonets . . .  Somebody started yelling, 
'l.ynch hcr1 Lynch her! ' "  
"I lried to see a friendly face somewhere in the mob ... ," Elizabeth recalls. "[looked 
inlo the face of an old woman, and it seemed a kind face, but when I looked at her again, 
she spat on me." 
The young woman heard someone snarl, "No nigger bi1ch is going to get in our school. 
( iet out of here." The guards looked on impassively; Eckford was on her own. "I looked 
down l hc hlock and saw a bench at 1he bus stop. Then I lhought, 'If I can only get lhcrc, I 
will he safe.· " She ran to the bench and sat down, bul a duster of ru ffians had followed her. 
"Drag her OVl'r to the tree," said one of them, calling for a lynching. 
Tht·n Benjamin Fine, an education writer for the New York Times. put his arm around 
Eli1ahe1h. "He raised my chin and said. 'Don't let them sec you cry,' .. she recalls. Fmally 
:1 white woman named Grace Lorch, whose husband taught at a local black colkge. guided 
Fli1aheth a\vav from the mob. The two tried to enter a nearby drugst<)rc to call a cab. but 
snmrnne slam�ncd the door in their faces. Then they spotted a hus coming and quickly 
hnardcd it. Lorch accompanied Elizabeth home safely. but the experience had kft ih mark. 
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issue "now is whether or not a head of a sovereign state can exercise his con­
stitutional powers and discretion in maintaining peace and good order within 
his jurisdiction .... "61 
Federal Judge Ronald Davies, presiding over the case, on September 5th 
requested that the Justice Department investigate the disruption of the deseg­
regation plan,62 and on September 7th turned down the school board's request 
to suspend the desegregation plan. 63 On September 9th, Judge Davies re­
ceived the Justice Department's report and directed the department to file a 
petition for injunction against Governor Faubus.64 A hearing on the matter 
was set for September 20.65 Negotiations in the meantime with federal offi­
cials, including the President, resolved nothing except that Faubus would obey 
the decision of the federal district court. 66 
At the hearing on Friday, September 20th, no evidence was presented 
that showed a concern for violence before September 3rd, and as a result an 
order ensued enjoining the governor's actions. 67 In response Faubus withdrew 
the Guard but claimed that a "crucifixion" would be coming.68 When the 
following Monday came, Faubus turned out to be nearly correct, for a nearly 
rioting crowd outside the school caused the withdrawal of the Black students 
b efore the day was finished. 69 The following day, none of the Black students 
Afterwards, the fifteen-year-old sometimes woke in the night, terrified, screaming about the 
mob. 
EYES ON THE PRIZE, supra note 2, at 101 -02. The call for a lynching was not necessarily rhetorical. 
Barely two years before, in August 1955 a fifteen-year old Black boy was lynched in Money, Missis­
sippi. Id. at 37-57. See also s. WHITFIELD, A DEATH IN THE DEL TA: THE STOR Y OF EMMITT TILL 
(1988). One of the last recorded racial lynchings in the nation occurred two years after the Little 
Rock crisis, in 1959 in Lumbarton, Mississippi. See H. SMEAD, BLOOD JUSTICE: THE LYNCHING OF 
MACK CHARLES PARKER xi (1986). 
6 1 .  Telegram, September 4, 1957, Orval Faubus to President Eisenhower, printed in Southern 
School News October, 1957, at 1-2, excerpted at W. RECORD & J. RECORD, supra note 28, at 39. 
FREYER, supra note 10, at 105. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. Aaron v. Cooper, Civil Action No. 31 1 3  (E.D. Ark. Septemeber 7, 1957). Order, re­
printed in 2 RACE REL LAW REP. 941; oral statement in support thereof, Id. at 940. FREYER, supra 
note 10, at 105. 
64. FREYER, supra note 10 at 106. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. Federal officials failed to take a strong stand against Governor Faubus. "Negotiations 
came to focus on findm
.� 
some means for Faubus to retreat without making it seem that he was 
backmg ct.own w1Hmgly. Id. See also Governor Faubus' description of his meeting on September with President Eisenhower. FAUBUS, DOWN FROM THE HILLS supra note 5, at 2 5 5-5 8. No public 
pressure was put on Faubus to change his stance. President Eisenhower, for example, after meeting 
with Faubus stated that h e  was "gratified by [the Governor's] constructive and cooperative atti­
tude .... (and] 
.
was pleased to hear from the Governor of the progress already made in the elimina­
lton of segregation mother activites in the State of Arkansas." D. Eisenhower, Statement September 
14, 1 957 . . 1957. PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 1 ,  a� 674. Brooks Hays, a representative in Congress representing 
.
Little Rock, sugges.ted that the President federalize the National Guard and neutralize the governors authority, but this suggestion was disallo w ed by fed I t' t FREYER, supra 
note I 0, at I 06. 
era nego Ja ors. 
67. FREYER, supra note 10 at 107. Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Su . 220 (E.D. Ark. 1957). 68. FREYFR, s11pra note 10, at 107. 
pp 
69. Id. at 107, 108. Se_e EYES
_ 
ON THE PRIZE, supra note 2, at 105, 1 06: 
The black Journalists arrived at Central seconds before the t d t A h ,. t out of their car, the 8:45 school bell rang. Suddenly some . 
s
th
u e
h
n s. s
f 
t
h 
e •
d
•ourd 
go
f 
h.t ti d "L k h h 
• one m e t  rong o un re s ow 1 es ye e . oo , ere t ey come!" The reporters had a · � parents escorting their children to school. About twent whf par�ntly been mistaken or down the street· others soon follow d N Y tes egan to chase the men · · · e . ewsman Alex Wilson h fl d savaged. "Somebody had a brick in his hand ,, c ?se not to e e  an was , remembers James Hicks, another of Journal-
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attended, but another crowd was present at the school, bent on preventing the 
desegregation of Central High School. 70 
President Eisenhower took action in response to the two days' events. On 
September 23, 1957, he released a statement promising to use "the full power 
of the United States including whatever force may be necessary to prevent any 
obstruction of the law and to carry out the orders of the Federal Court. "71 On 
September 24th, Eisenhower ordered regular army troops to Little Rock to 
protect the students, and federalized the Arkansas National Guard as well, as 
much to prevent their use for any contrary purpose as to aid in the protection 
of the students. 72 
The soldiers of the lOlst Airborne Division left Little Rock on November 
27, 1957 and were replaced at Central High School by the federalized Na­
tional Guard. 73 By this time opposition to desegregation was fixed, and there 
was still a good deal of unrest at the school. 74 As a result the school board 
ists, "an
� instead of throwing the brick, 'cause he was too close, he hit Alex Wilson up the 
side of his head .. . Wilson was more than six feet tall, an ex-Marine-he went down like a 
tree." 
• • • 
With the students out of reach, the mob turned its anger on white journalists on the 
sc�ne. Life magazine reporter Paul Welch and two photographers, Grey Villet and Francis 
Miller, were harrassed and beaten. The photographers' equipment was smashed to the 
ground. The crowd began to chant to the white students now staring out of Central's win­
dows, "Don't stay in there with them." 
Before noon the mob had swelled to about a thousand people, and Police Chief Gene 
Smith felt compelled to quell the rioting by removing the black students from the school. 
70. FREYER, supra note 10, at 108. On September 24, "11 persons [were arrested], including two 
youths who appeared to be of high school age. All were white men. That brought the number of 
arrests for the two days to 44, including both whites and Negroes." R. Morin, Sacramento Bee, 
September 24, 1957, at I, A6., reprinted in W. RECORD & J. RECORD, supra note 28, at 67, 68. 
71. D. Eisenhower, Statement, September 23, 1957, 1957 PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note I, at 689. 
72. FREYER, supra note 10, at 108. Technically, Eisenhower merely directed the Secretary of 
Defense to take "appropriate steps" to enforce the court's order in Little Rock, and to federalize units of the Arkansas guard "as he may deem appropriate." Executive Order 10,730, supra note I. 
73. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I, 13 (1958). 
74. See, e.g., the notes of Arkansas Gazette reporters in Southern School News, January 1958, reprinted in W. RECORD & J. RECORD, supra note 28, at 84: 
considerable amount of remarks, "Hey, nigger" when the Negroes walk around th.e corri­dors. Several have been run into "on purpose" and their books knocke� out of their arms. 
Most of this seems to be done by sophomores and juniors, not the seniors. "' "' . 
Reportedly the most unpopular [Negro] is Minnie Brown-;�no�n .as ."The Big M" because of her size. Termed "the type who would cause a fight, �mme, it seem�, t�l�s 
back (the others don't) and reportedly sometimes not in a very lady-hke manner. Mmme ts 
supposed to have asked a white boy in a classroom to move his foot. He refused. She 
stepped on his foot and he slapped her. She went rushing outside for her IO!st guard, the 
teacher told him to stay outside, that that was her classroom and that she would take care 
of the situation. He did and she did. Id. Minnie Brown's tendency to retaliate led to disciplinary action against her: 
Shortly before Christmas, one of the Little Rock Nine �ecided,,
to fight back. "For a 
couple of weeks there had been a number of white kids following us, recalls Ernest Gre�n, 
"�ontinuously calling us niggers. 'Nigger, nigger, nigger' -one. 
right. 
afte.r the other. Mm­
nteJean Brown was in the lunch line with me, and there was t�1s white kid wh� was much 
shorter than Minnie . .. he reminded me of a small dog yelping at somebod� 5. leg: 
"Minnie had just picked up her chili, and before I could even say · .  ·. · Mmme, wh.Y 
don't you tell him to shut up?' Minnie . . .  turned around and.took that ch1h and dum��d it 
on the dude's head." For a moment, the cafeteria was de�d st.lent, Green r�members, an
d 
then the help, all black, broke into applause. And the white kids there d1dn t �no�. 
what to 
do. It was the first time that anybody [there] had seen .somebody black re
tahate. 
The incident led to Minniejean's suspension. Then, m February, she was expelled from 
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sought to postpone desegregation. 
The Supreme Court resolved the status of d esegregation in Litt le  Rock by 
ruling on September 1 2, 1 958, that desegregation would not be suspended and 
m ust proceed apace.75 Before this event, however, several other e vents took 
place. Central High School graduated its fi rst Black student, 76 and Orval 
Faubus won the nomination of the Democratic Party to a third term as gover­
nor by an unprecedented sixty-nine percent of  the vote. 77 Brooks Hays, the 
congressman who had counseled moderation, beat a segregationist candidate 
i n  the Democratic primary, normally tantamount to election,78 but lost in No­
vember to a segregationist write-in candidacy initiated two weeks before the 
election.79 James Johnson parlayed his high profile on segregation into a seat 
o n  the Arkansas Supreme Court. 80 
In these events are two lessons. The first is that desegregation ,  as the law 
of the land, was inevitable. The second is that political success in the South 
often coincided with fervent opposition to desegregation. The crisis in Little 
Rock was not caused by constitutional theories in conflict, but rather by polit­
ical surrender to racism. 
II .  THE PAST As P ROLOGUE 
Arkansas politicians were not the only ones who surrendered to racism. 
The United States Supreme Court surrendered or at least compromised with 
racism in rendering the implementation formula of Brown II. While Brown J's 
1 954 pronouncement that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently une­
qual"8 1 represented a major step forward, the pronouncement of Brown II in 
1955 that desegregation of schools should be implemented "with all deliberate 
speed,"82 represented at least a half step back.  District judges were to imple­
ment the rule of Brown I "by dealing with 'varied local problems,' according 
to 'equitable principles' that were guided by 'practical flexibility' in 'adjusting 
and reconciling public and private needs.' "83 Brown II, it has been correctly 
Central after a white girl called her a "nigger bitch" and she in turn denounced t he young 
woman as "white trash." 
EYES ON THE PRIZE, supra note 2, at 1 1 7. Southern School News, March 1 958, at 1, reprinted in W. 
RECORD & J: RECORD, supra note 28, at 89, reported Brown's reaction to her expulsion: 
I just can't take everything they throw at me without fighting back . 
. I don't think people realize w�at
_
goes on at Central, she said. "You just wouldn't 
beheve 1t. T
_
hey throw rocks, the� spill mk on your clothes, they call you "nigger," they just 
keep bothermg you every five mmutes. 
After Brown's expulsion, students circulated printed cards saying "One Down, Eight to Go." Id. 
EYES ON THE PRIZE, supra note 2, at 1 17. 
75. Cooper v. Aaron, 3 5 8  U.S. I ( 1 958). 
76. EYES ON THE PRIZE, supra note 2, at 1 1 8 .  Even at this point racism disrupted the peace of 
the school. After the baccalaureate service a graduating senior spat in the face of a black leaving the 
ceremony, but was arrested for his deed. Perhaps as a result no incidents were recorded at the gradua­
tion ceremony two days later. Southern School News, June 1958, at 10, reprinted in w. RECORD & J. 
RECORD, supra note 28, at 9 5 .  
77. FREYER, supra note 10, at 1 47. EYES O N  T H E  PRIZE, supra note 2 ,  at 1 1 8 .  
78. FREYER, supra note 10.  
79. Id. at 157,  1 58. 
80. Id. at 147. 
8 1 .  Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
82. Brown, 349 U.S. at 300. 
83. FREYER, supra note 10, at 9, (quoting Brown II, 349 U.S. at 298-99). 
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stated, "reflected compromise and equivocation i n  virtually every line. "84 
Brown JI, in effect, represen te d  a pact between the Supreme Court and the 
South : desegregation would occur, but slowly and with delay ample for the 
South to win battles even though it had lost the war. 8 5  
The Supreme Court in Brown II failed to consider the implications of the 
pre-Brown higher education desegregation decisions, and this failure of vision 
had unfortunate consequences for the point the Court attempted to make clear 
in Brown I. For these decisions and other cases involving the desegregation o f  
higher e ducation constitute a clear suggestion that n o  matter how forthright 
and lacking in compromise and equivocation such a mandate might be, the 
South would find ways to avoid and otherwise minimize the effect of court 
mandates respecting desegregation. 86 
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada 87 alone makes this suggestion. Decided 
in 19 3 8 ,  Gaines was the first of a series of desegregation decisions by the 
Supreme Court before Brown . Gaines found if not its genesis, certainly its im­
petus, in the efforts of the NAACP to overcome the legacy of Plessy v. Fergu­
son .  88 While Plessy had dealt specifically with segregation in public 
accommodations, the Supreme Court approved segregation in higher educa­
tion in 1 908 in Berea College v. Kentucky, 89 and by 1 927 the Supreme Court 
described the doctrine of separate but equal in education as "many times de­
cided. "90 The NAACP strategy for overcoming separate but equal was to at-
84. H utch inson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decision-making in the Supreme Court, 1948-
1 958. 68 GEO. L.J. 4, 56 ( 1 979). 
8 5 .  This pact was completely at odds with the previous understanding that the constitutional 
right to equality of t reatment "is a personal one." McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Rail­
way Co., 2 3 5  U.S .  IS I, 1 6 1  ( 1 9 14). The S upreme Court had long since held that "[i]t is the individu a l  
w h o  is entitled t o  equal protection of t h e  laws . . . . " Id. a t  1 6 1 ,  1 62.  Even i f  t h e  individual might s t i l l  
'"properly complain that his constitutional privilege has been invaded[,]" id. a t  162, under Brown II 
an individual whose right to an equal education had been violated might never come to experience 
desegregation.  Brown II recognized that  "the personal interest of t h e  plaintiffs" was at stake, but 
stated that this  interest was only in achieving an equal education "as soon as practicable."  Brown I/, 
349 U.S. a t  299 (emphasis added). The brief in Brown filed in December 1 952 by the U.S. Depart­
ment  of Justice, was the first suggestion ever of such a position, and even its  chief architect, Phil l ip 
Elman. thought  it was "entirely unprincipled, it was just plain wrong as a matter of constitutional 
law. to suggest that someone whose personal constitutional rights were being violated should be de­
nied r.: l ief. . .  Elman, The Soliciter General's Office. Justice Frankfurter. and Civil Rights litigation, 
l 'i46-J 960: A 11 Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 8 1 7, 827 ( 1987).  His reason for making this "un­
princ ip led" suggestion was to assure t h at t he Supreme Court would issue a unanimous opinion i n  
llmw11 overrul ing Plessy. From his discussions with Justice Frankfu rter, Elman viewed the issuance 
of a unanimous opinion as important, the alternative to which he viewed as "an incredible godawful 
mess: poss ibly nine different opinions, nine different views on the Court.  I t  would have set back t h e  
cause o f  desegregation; and i t  would have damaged the Court. "  Id. at 8 2 8, 829.  
l\6.  This is a clear inference to be made from M. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY 
A < ; ·\ I NST S E G R EGATED EDUCATION, 1 925- 1 950 ( 1 987). 
H7. 305 U.S. 337 ( 1 938).  
XX. 1 63 U.S.  5 3 7  ( 1 896). While L loyd Gaines may have wanted to attend the University of 
M i ssouri. th ere was no guarantee that t h e  NAACP would support h im simply on this account. The 
NA J\CI' took care to properly screen the applicants it supported. They had not only to be "qual i­
ficd . " "  hu t "of outstanding scholarship . . . neat, personable. and unm istakably a Negro." William 
Hast ic. staff counsel to the NAACP, q uoted in TusHNET, supra note 86. at 36. 37. The attack on 
'egrcgated education began with graduate and professional education; such chal lenges found plain­
t i ffs more readily available and were more easily lit igated since rhc problem to he resolved general ly  
w a s  nor "separate but equal" but instead "separate and non-existant ."  Id. at 36. 42. 
89 2 1 1  U.S. 45 ( 1 908). 
90. Gong Lum v.  Rice, 275 U.S.  7 8 ,  86 ( 1 927). 
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tack the "equal" part of the separate but equal equation. I n  1 936, in Pearson 
v. Murray,9 1 the NAACP convinced the M aryland Supreme Court that an 
out-of-state scholarship program did not provide for Blacks a legal education 
equal to that provided for Whites at the U n iversity of Maryland. I n  1 937, in 
Gaines the NAACP made a similar attempt before the M issouri Supreme 
Court, and failed. 92 
The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, where, in 
19 38, the NAACP won the case.'1·1 While the Supreme Court did not chal­
lenge the doctrine of separate but equal, the  Court did recognize as unconsti­
t utional the legislative scheme which allowed Whites to attend law school at 
the University of Missouri but forbade Black s  to do the same, in the absence of 
an equal law school for Blacks.94 The fact t hat the legislature had provided 
that the state's university for Blacks, Lincoln U niversity, had the  d iscretion to 
open a law school was not adequate to overcome the constitutional objection; 
the mere legislative purpose to establish the separate but equal facility was not 
enough.95 The case was remanded to the Missouri Supreme Court for pro­
ceedings "not inconsistent" with the United States Supreme Court opinion.96 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Gaines may well have been thought by 
detractors of segregation as a great victory, 97 and perhaps the principle estab­
lished did constitute such a victory. But t h e  authorities in Missouri saw to it 
that Gaines himself never saw the fruits o f  that victory. 
The Missouri Supreme Court rendered its decision on the remanded case 
in August 19 39.98 Gaines failed in his attempt to achieve entrance to the Uni­
versity of Missouri. The state legislature, between the United St ates Supreme 
Court opinion and the second state court o pinion, had enacted into law a pro­
vision making mandatory the establishment of a law school for Blacks at 
Lincoln University .99 The United States Supreme Court had ruled Gaines 
"entitled to be admitted to the State University in the absence of other and 
proper provision for his training." 100 Since that absence had been redressed, 
the state court held that Gaines had n o  right to attend the University of 
Missouri. 
Lincoln University, thus, would go on to establish a law school, a school 
with limited funds, 1 0 1  only a small number o f  books, 102 located in a building 
9 1 .  1 82 A. 595 (Md. 1 9 36). 
92 .  1 1 3 S.W
.
2d 783 (Mo. 1937).  
9 3 .  305 U.S.  337 ( 1 93 8). 
94. Id. at 349, 350 
The basic consideraton is not as 
_
to what sort of opportunities other states provide, or whether they are as good as those m M1ssoun, but as to what opportunities Missouri itself furmshes to white students and demes to negroes solely on the ground of color. The admis­s1b1l1ty of laws separating the races m the enjoyment of privileges afforded by the state rests wholly upon the equality of the privileges which the laws give to the separate groups within the state. 
Id. at 349. 
9 5 .  Id. at 346. 347. 
96.  Id. at 352.  
97.  The Nation , for example, carried an article w h ich termed the d · · .. ·1 h 1. · . .  d 1- 1 .  
· · . . . 
ec1s1on a m1 estone, epoc · ma ... ing. an cause or · · u n  1m1l lng reJOtcmg." 1 47 THE NATION 696 ( 1 938) 
CJ8. 1 3 1  S.W. 2<l 2 1 7  (Mo. 1 9 3CJ). . 
9CJ. 1 9 39 Mo. Laws 6 3 5 .  See 1 3 1  S.W. 2d at 2 1 8. 2 1 9 .  
1 00. Id. al 2
_
J K  (emphasis supplied 
_
by the Missouri Supreme Court). 
J O I .  The leg1slature appropriated $200,000, TUS H N ET, supra note 86, at 73, but the university 
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shared with a motion picture t heater whose sound system treated the law 
school's students each day to a distraction from study in the sounds of the 
latest in movie entertainment. 103 Whether Gaines might have successfully 
challenged the new law school's equality to the law school at the University of 
Missouri, as the NAACP had planned to test 104 and as the Missouri Supreme 
Court had suggested as Gaines' remedy, 105 is unknown. During the litigation, 
Lloyd Gaines had received a m a ster's degree from the University of Michigan 
and sometime in 1939 had disappeared . 106 By the end of 1 939, the NAACP 
was forced to accept a dismissal o f  the case. 107 
In effect, the Gaines case represented a formula for the frustration of at­
tempts to d esegregate education a l  institutions. The first element of the formula 
was delay. Gaines had applied to law school in 1 93 5  and was finally denied 
admission in 1 939, by which point he had apparently lost interest in law, at 
least at the institution he had c hosen originally. The second element was a 
willingness on the part of state officials to overlook the intent of Supreme 
Court pronouncements on the subject of desegregation and instead to look for 
loopholes w hich might allow the choice of segregation to survive. The third 
element was state legislative and administrative authority responsiveness to  
less enlightened themes dominating the state's political will, authority deter­
mined to place every available obstacle between its people and its schools on 
the one hand, and desegregation on the other. 
Each of  these elements was at work in the crisis surrounding the desegre­
gation of Little Rock's Central High School. The Little Rock school board 
initially proposed only a modest plan of desegregation, then retreated to a 
minimalist plan when the promise of Brown II was anticipated. In short, the 
Little Roc k  school authorities took what the Supreme Court gave them, and 
they took the good along with the bad. 
While the response of the school board is not so different from that of  
state authorities in  Gaines, the response of Arkansas' governor and legislature 
and of Arkansas' people, who sought to nullify the judicial mandate of deseg­
regation, is. Part of this difference may well be allayed to the emotional impact 
of schooling for children as opposed to graduate and professional education 
for adults. But part of the difference also must be in an unintended effect of 
Brown II. Given suggestions by the Court itself that its own decision in Brown 
I might legally be circumvented, state authorites in Little Rock looked for 
excuses to believe that the mandate of desegregation was merely an unwel­
come suggestion and not the law of the land. 
Whether the Supreme Court should have anticipated the resistance of the 
South in the form of physical violence cannot be ascertained and is not sug­
gested. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court may well have been on notice that 
the all deliberate speed implementation formula of Brown II was merely a call 
only controlled a fraction of that amount. N. Barksdale, The Gaines Case and Its Effect in Negro 
Education in Missouri, 5 1  SCHOOL AND SOCIETY 309, 3 1 2  ( 1940). 
102. Bluford, The Lloyd Gaines Story, 32 J. OF Eouc. Soc. 242, 244 ( 1 95 8). 
103. "Jim Crow" Law School, 14 NEWSWEEK 32 ( 1 939); TUSHNET, supra note 86, at 73. 
104. TUSHN ET, supra note 86, at 74. 
105.  Gaines, 1 3 1  S. W.2d at 2 1 9 .  
106. Bluford, supra note 102, at 245, 246; TusHNET. supra note 86, at 74. 
1 07. TUSHNET, supra note 86, at 74. 
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for and an encouragement to official state opposition, even though desegre­
gaton under Brown I should have been recognized to be inevitable. 
Notice of the South's political will to avoid desegregation is suggested by 
the Gaines case. How much weight this suggestion should bear can only be 
determined by examining the entire history of pre-Brown higher education de­
segregation. If the suggestion bears the weight indicated by Gaines, then the 
riddle as to why the Little Rock crisis took place finds part of its answer in the 
refusal of the Supreme Court to have been more forthright in the manner of 
implementing the moral and constitutional precepts of Brown I. 
III .  THE SOUTHERN FAILURE OF JUSTIFICATION 
Part II of this Article suggests that the implementation formula of Brown 
II gave encouragement to the White South in its die-hard enthusiasm for seg­
regated schools and in its desire for elected officials to resist desegregation. In 
the Little Rock crisis, Arkansas public officials went beyond the Gaines o��o­
sition formula of delay, determination, and cleverness within the opportuntU�s 
allowed by law, and actually defied the law. The actions of Arkansas' publtc 
officials in turn encouraged White opposition to desegregation. . 
This point, however, begs the question of whether there is any constitu­
tional rather than political justification for the official actions taken by Arkan­
sas officials. Whatever the justification, it cannot lie in the first amendment, 
108 
wh�ch certainly shields the speech of parties private and public who wou�d 
resist or even advocate resistance to desegregation. The first amendment, tn 
e�ect, guarantees the right to disagree, a not inconsiderable right; but the offi­
ci�l state actions precipitating the Little Rock crisis went beyond disagreement 
with the mandate of desegregation, subsuming active frustration of that man­
date instead. 
A. The Call of Localism 
. �he political justifiction offered by Arkansas authorities was that of loca
l­
�sm, 1�� effect. a skewed reading of states' rights and constitutio
nal fed.er
al­
ism. The idea that local concerns might take precedence over a na�wnal 
mandate was not a completely outrageous one. This in fact was the pomt of 
1 08. Congress shall make no_ law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the 
free exercise thereof; or abndgmg the freedom of speech, or the press; or the right of the 
people peacebly to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 
U .S. CO�ST. AMEND I. 
1 09. 
_
In his inaugural speech for his second term, Governor Faubus stated his opposition " "to any 
forcible integration of our public schools. These matters t b I f t th ·11 of the people tn 
h · d. · 
· · · mus e e t o e w1 t e van��� 1stncts. The people must decide on the basis of what is best as a whole for each particu-
lar area. BARTL_EY, MASSIVE RESISTANCE, supra note 10, at 26 ! ,  (quoting Faubus' inaugural ad­
dress as reprinted 1n the Arkansas Gazette, January 1 6, 1 957). In September 1 9 57, Governor Faubus 
reiterated 
_
desegrega11on to be a ·:local problem . . .  best . . .  solved on the local level according to th
e 
peculiar circumstances and conditions of each local school district. ..  Southern School News, Octobe
r 
1957, 2-5.  quoted 111 FREYER, supra note 10 at 80 St t Ed . C . . F d thought 
. 
. 
. . 
. . 
· 
· a e ucauon omm1ss1oner or 
mterpos1t10111st mea
.
�u res had virtue m that "it would help [local] districts which wanted to keep their segregated schools. Southern School News, December 1956 8 · d · w R ORD & J . R · 26 27 E. h L. • p. , reprmte 111 • EC !·.CORD. supra note , at . 1g t 11tle Rock aldermen I d · h calling , . . . N· · re ease a statement approving t e . of the A rkansa� at1onal Guard to halt desegregation as th. ..  h d · f h h !ming 
· · f 
· · f L. I 
· is was t e esire o t e overw e maJonty o the citizens o l it e  Rock." Southern School News Oct b 1 9 . 2 rinred in W.  R ECORD & J . RrcoRll .  supra note 28. a t  42. 0 er 57, at • rep 
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the all deliberate speed formula of Brown II. But in Brown II, the Supreme 
Court had cited localism only as a factor to be considered by federal district 
courts when implementing the federal mandate, not as an excuse for state au­
thorities to override the federal mandate. Localism, as the state obstruction­
ists invoked it, was a concept in conflict with the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution, which states clearly that the "Constitution . . .  shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land . . .  anything in the Constitution or laws of any State 
to the contrary nontwithstanding." 1 10 
· 
In the case of Little Rock, the call to localism is an ironic one, for local 
governmental interest in Little Rock favored desegregation, and the voices of 
resistance in Little Rock originated from outside Little Rock 1 1 1  and indeed, 
outside Arkansas. 1 1 2 The local school board had found a way to live with the 
mandate of desegregation, and in this was the will of the local community. 
Thus, for Governor Faubus and the Arkansas legislature to truly represent 
local interests, they would have given political and administrative support to 
the desegregation plan, and not argued localism while in fact frustrating it. 1 1 3 
In calling out the National Guard, the governor had not consulted with 
any of the local authorities in Little Rock, who, a federal district court found, 
"were prepared to cope with any incidents which might arise . . . . " 1 1 4 Instead 
of furthering local interests, the actions of Governor Faubus were quite to the 
contrary. The Little Rock school board expressed it well: 
The effect of [calling out of the National Guard,] was to harden the core of 
opposition to the Plan and cause many persons who theretofore had reluc­
tantly accepted the Plan to believe that there was some power in the State of 
Arkansas which, when exerted, could nullify the Federal law and permit 
disobedience of the decree of [the District] Court, and from that date hostil­
ity to the Plan was increased and criticism of the officials of the [School] 
District has become more bitter and unrestrained. 1 15  
1 10. U.S.  CONST. art. IV,  cl .  2. 
1 1 1 . Segregationist spokesman and activist James Johnson, a 1 957 gubernatorial candidate, hailed 
�rom Crossett in southeastern Arkansas. FREYER, supra note 10, at 68. For a description of his not 
inconsiderable influence on the Little Rock crisis, see FREYER, supra note 10, at 64-66, 68-74 & 78-82. 
Governor Faubus himself was from Huntsville in Madison county. FAUBUS, DOWN FROM THE 
HILLS, supra note 5, at I, 3. Even though he resided in Little Rock as a state government official in 
1949-53 and after taking office as Governor in 1 955, Faubus was nonetheless a state official and not a 
l?cal one. FREYER, supra note 10, at 23.  1 1  WHO'S WHO supra note 30, at 325. C.f the desegrega­
tion of Hoxie, Arkansas. See FREYER, supra note 10, at 63-68. See also note 1 1 1  infra. 
1 1 2. E.g. ,  Rev. J. A. Lovell of Dallas, Texas was a guest speaker before the Little Rock Capital 
Citizens' Council, FREYER, supra note 10, at 93. Marvin Griffin, Governor of Georgia, on August 
22� 1 957 delivered in Little Rock a speech which is credited by Freyer and also Gov�rnor Fa_ubus as 
being responsible for generating a major change of opinion in Little Rock and as bemg the impetus 
for Faubus' dispatch of the National Guard to prevent desegregation. FREYER, supra note 10, at 100-
0 1 ,  103. See also Southern School News, September 1 957 at 7, reprinted in part in W. RECORD & J .  
RECORD, supra note 28,  at  at  32-33, for a report of Griffin's speech. 
1 1 3. See FREYER,  supra note 1 0, at 1 1 6 and citations therein. When the governor called out. the 
National Guard to prevent desegregation, the mayor of Little Rock noted that "[t]he people of Little 
Rock recently had a school board election and elected by an overwhelming vote the school board 
members who advocated [gradual integration]." In exasperation he offered t_
hat "were_ [it] not .for my own respect for due process of law, I would be tempted to issue an executive order mterposmg the 
Clly of Little Rock between Gov. Faubus and the Little Rock school board." Southern School News 
October 1 957 p. I ,  reprinted in W. RECORD & J. RECORD, supra note 28, at 37. 
1 1 4. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. at 10, (citing Aaron v. Cooper, 1 56 F. Supp. 220 at 225). 
1 1 5. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. at 10, (quoting the school board's petition before the district 
court). 
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In short, the call to localism was not only misplaced, but hypocritical as well. 
Addtionally, in Little Rock the call to localism was self-serving.  Whether 
local interests were argued to predominate depended on the federal interests at 
stake. In the South, "[l]ocalism, manifested as  a general distrust of outsiders 
and mixed with a touch of paranoia, whether anti-Communist, anti-semitic, or 
anti-big business, w as a dynamic element in  southern attitudes. " 
1 1 6 Similarly 
and yet by contrast, " at times, [southern politicians] appealed fervently to the 
Constitution as the touchstone of benign n ation al strength; but on other occa­
sions they attacked the evil of the federal octopus with all the resolutions of 
demogogues." 1 1 7 Where federal power brought economic benefit, it was ex­
tolled; but when federal power threatened the Southern way of life, it was 
villified. "In such an environment political expediency gave words such as 
federal, state's rights, and Constitution a manifestly symbolic meaning." 1 1 8 
This framework belies but also explains the assertion of local ism as a jus­
tification for the official actions taken opposing desegregation i n  the Little 
Rock crisis. Localism, states' rights, and federalism were concepts that could 
not be divorced from the context in which they were raised, and thus offered 
no independent justification for any activity undertaken in Little Rock by offi­
cial actors opposing desegregation. The bottom line is that official  resistance 
in  Little Rock was simply political. The best politics became the politics of 
obstruction and resistance. 
B. The Doctrine of Interposition 
. 
To be sure, this resistance had a purportedly legal basis. The basis was the 
doctrine of interposition. Simply put, according to the doctrine, when the fed­
eral government or some facet thereof undertook an unconstitutional act, a 
state could interpose itself between its citizens and the federal government, 
thereby nullifying the power of the federal government to act. B y  the time of 
the Little Rock crisis, however, the doctrine h ad been completely scuttled as 
an acceptable facet of constitutional law. 
The doctrine of interposition did not rise fully formed from the heads of 
Southern obstructionists, as did Athena rise from the head of Zeus in classis­
cal Greek mythology. 1 1 9 The classical origin of interposition lies instead in 
the writings of such early American giants as James Madison and John C. 
Calhoun. Madison saw the power of state governments in this l ight:  
[I]n case of a deliberate, palpable and dangerous exercise [by the federal 
government] _of other powers not _
granted by the said compact, t h e  States 
who are �art1es thereto have the n�ht, and are in duty bound, to interpose 
for a�rest_m� the progress . �
f the
. evil, and for maintaining, within their re­spective ltm1ts, the authont1es, nghts, and liberties appertaining to them. 1 20 
1 1 6. FREYER, supra note 1 0, at 10- 1 1 .  
1 1 7. Id. at 1 1 . 
1 1 8 . Id. 
1 1 9. See E. HAMi i.TON,  MYTHOLOGY 29-30 ( 1 940). 
1 20. Resolution of Dec. 24, 1 798 VA. STAT. AT LARGE 192 ( 1 806). A th d b M d"son the I · · d · · R . 
u ore y a 1 , 
reso ut 1011 1s quote 1 n pan m I ACE REI .. LAW REP.  468. Thomas Jefferson authored the corre-
spondmg Kentucky n:sol u t 1011 of 1 798. dated November 1 6, 1 798, reprinted in E. w ARFIELD. KEN­
TUCKY Rl'SOJ .L:TIO:"S 0 1  1 798 75-85 ( 1 894). K. AN DR ESEN , THE THEORY OF STATE l.!'i T E R l'osn.1or-o TO Cor-;TR�lt F1: � >E R,AI. ACTION 49 ( 1 96?) (University Microforms Inc.) (hereinafter i.: lted .1., A N I> K l -.S I·. :-; .  S l A ll·. IN l l·. R I OSl t lON). Jefferson s draft can be found at P. FORD, 7 THE 
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The powers of the federal judiciary were particularly suspect in Madison's 
view. He wrote in 1 799: 
However true, therefore, it may be that the judicial department is, in all 
questions submitted to it by t h e  forms of the Constitution, to decide in the 
last resort, this resort must necessarily be deemed the last in relation to the 
authorities of the other departments of the Government; not in relation to 
the rights of the parties to the constitutional compact, from which the judi­
cial as well as the other departments hold their delegated trusts. 
On any other hypothesis the delegation of judicial power would annul 
the authority delegating it; and t h e  concurrence of this department with the 
others in usurped powers might subvert forever, and beyond the possible 
reach of any rightful remedy, t h e  very Constitution w h i c h  all  were instituted 
to preserve. 1 2  1 
Calhoun emphatically agreed. "This right of interposition . . . I conceive to be 
the fundamental principle of our system. "  1 22 Yet, as Calhoun recognized, on 
the matter of interposition there were two sides to the tale. 1 23 
The contrary argument was p ut by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch 
v. Maryland: 
[T]he constitution and the laws made in pursuance t hereof are supreme; 
. . .  they control the constitutions and laws of the respective states and cannot 
be cont rolled by them . . . .  It is of the very essence of s u premacy, to remove 
all obstacles to its action within  its own sphere, and so to modify every 
power vested in subordinate governments, as to exempt its  own operations 
from t h eir own influence. 1 24 
Since in Marbury v. Madison it had already been established that "the prov­
ince and d uty of the judicial department [is] to say what the law is," 1 25 the 
case for those opposing interposition could with McCulloch be considered to 
have been closed. 
But the arguments over interposition had preceded Marbury and McCul­
loch , and they continued beyond these cases as well. The first expositions of 
the doctrine of interposition in the nation's history under the Constitution 
came a scant ten years after the Constitution's ratification, with the enactment 
of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1 79 8 .  126 Objecting to these acts on the 
ground that they violated the strictures of the first amendment, Kentucky and 
Virginia passed resolutions of interposition and urged other states to do the 
same. 1 27 A constitutional confrontation was spared when the Alien and Sedi­
tion Acts e x p ired in 1 80 1 .  
WRITINGS O F  THOMAS JEFFERSON 289-309 (1 892-99). For more o n  the views of Jefferson and 
Madison, see ANDRESEN, STATE INTERPOSITION 69-78. 
1 2 1 .  Committee report to Virginia House of Delegates, Session of 1 799-1 800, authored by 
Madison, quoted at I RACE REL. LAW REP. 469, also reprinted in E. POWELL, NULLIFICATION AND 
SECESSION IN THE UNITED STATES 100-04 ( 1 897). 
122. J .  Calhoun, Address of July 26, 1 83 1 ,  printed in 6 WORKS OF JOHN c. CALHOUN 61 ( 1 83 1 ), 
quoted in I R A C E  REL. LAW REP. 487. 
123 . Id. 
124. 1 7  U.S. (4 Wheat) 3 16, 426-27 ( 1 8 1 9). 
125. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 1 77 ( 1 803). 
126. Act of June 25, 1 798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 ( 1 798); Act of July 1 4, 1 798, ch. 74, I Stat. 596 
(I 798). 
127. Supra note 1 19 :  
Actually, t here were four sets of resolutions, each of the two state legislatures passing 
one set in 1 798, with Kentucky passing a second set the next year, followed by virginia in 
1 800. . . . Copies of the first sets of resolutions were sent to the other states by Kentucky 
and Virginia. Nine states replied to Virginia and eight to Kentucky, all disagreeing with the 
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The Supreme Court first passed directly on the doctrine of interposition 
P l-I  I D h in the 1 809 case of United States v. Peters . - n r-eters, t e Sup reme Court 
issued a writ of man d amus to a federal judge to enforce a judgment against the 
state of Pennsylvania.  The Pennsylvania legislature had passed an act which 
had defied an order of the federal circuit court requiring the governor "to 
demand for the use of the state of Pennsylv ania, the money which [was the 
subject of the judgement in federal court], "  1 2'> asserting that the federal court 
had had no jurisdiction to hear the case in question as a result  of the eleventh 
amendment. 
The Supreme Court in Peters disposed of the eleventh amendment ques­
tion against the interest of the state, and in doing so rejected the legislature's 
resolution of interposition : 
If the legislatures of the several states may at wi l l ,  annul the judgments of 
the courts of the United States, and destroy the righ ts acquired under those 
judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery. and the nation 
is deprived of the means of enforcing its laws by the instrumen tal i ty  of its 
own tribunals. . . . If the ultimate right to d etermine the jurisdict i on of the 
courts of the Union is placed by the const itu tion in the several state legisla­
tures, then this a c t  concludes the subject; but if that power necessarily re­
sides in the supreme judicial tribunal of t h e  nation, then the j u risd i c t ion of 
the District Court of Pennsylvania, over the case in  which that j u risdiction 
was exercised, ought to be most deliberately examined; and the act of Penn­
sylvania, with whatever repect it may be c o nsidered, cannot be pe rm i t ted to 
prejudice the question. 1 30 
The "Pennsylvania Rebellion" did not end, however, with t h e  opinion in 
Peters, for the state continued in the rhetoric and the exercise of interposition. 
The governor sent a message to the legisl ature stating his inten tion to call out 
the militia to prevent enforcement of the court decree. The l egisl ature re­
sponded with resolutions maintaining " a  most exteme state ment of State· 
rights and Nullification" and denying the power of the Supreme Court to have 
adjudicated the case. 1 3 1  In the end, when a federal marshal sought to serve 
process in connection with the case, he was met with the state militia,  and the 
general of the militia was ultimately indicted, arrested, and conv icted for his 
deeds, all with the support of James M adison, 1 32 then President of the United 
States. By this time, however, the troops had been withdrawn a n d  judgment 
had been executed in pursuance of the decree in Peters, and within a month of 
the general's conviction, he received a p ardon from President MadisonY3 
The point had been made, however - the state had no power to oppose the 
i nterposition ideas expressed in the interposition resolutions of the two protesting states. 
These replies caused the issuance of the second sets of Resolutions. 
ANDRESEN, STATE I N T ERPOSITION, supra note 1 19 ,  at 48, 49 (footnotes omitted). These resolutions 
are reprinted together m J. ELLIOT, 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONV ENTIONS 528-29, 540-44 (1 876). 
1 28. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 1 1 5 ( 1 809). 
1 29 .  Id. at 1 3 5 .  
1 30. Id. at 1 36.  
1 3  I .  1 809 Pa. Laws 200, approved April 3, 1 809. 
1 3 2. 1 RACE REL.  LAW R EP. 476-77 ( 1 9 56). 
1 33. Id. The Pennsylvania Rebellion is d iscussed in ANDRESEN, STATE INTERPOSITION, supra note 1 20, al 28-30, and c. WARREN, l THE SUPREME COURT IN  UNITED ST 
- H 96- 1 0 1 ( 1 926). ATES ISTORY 
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authority of the courts of the federal government, and the federal government 
was entirely capable of enforcin g  this position. 
Each new incident of interposition following Peters resulted in political or 
constitutional rejection of interposition. In 1 8 1 6, i n  Martin v. Hunter's 
Lessee, 1 34 the Supreme Court rejected the position that Virginia's highest 
court could refuse to obey a Supreme Court decision rendered on appeal from 
the Virginia court. 135 The Hartford Convention of 1 8 1 4, involved New En­
glanders who opposed the War of 1 8 1 2, resented the advantages the South 
accured as a result of the three fi fths clause of the Constitution 1 36 and feared 
southern and westward expansion, defended interposition by the states i n  
cases o f  "deliberate, dangerous and palpable" infractions of the Constitu­
tion. 137  The convention resulted in "the complete annihilation from the 
American political scene of the Federalist party . . . .  " 1 38 In 1 8 19, McCulloch 
v. Maryland 1 39 rejected Maryland's attempt to oppose the institution and con­
tinued operation of the Bank of the United States. 
South Carolina's Ordinance of Nullification 140 declaring the federal tariffs 
of 1 82 8 1 4 1  and 1 83 2 1 42 void within the state met with President Jackson's 
quick disp atch of the navy to Charleston Harbor, 143 four companies of artil­
lery and fi ve thousand muskets to Fort Moultrie outsid e  of Charleston, 144 and 
134. 14 U. S. (I Wheat) 304 ( 1 8 1 6). 
1 3 5 .  A bad idea, like bad grass, is hard to kill. This same notion that the Supreme Court was 
without power to override a state court was afoot when the California Supreme Court refused to 
allow a writ o f  error to the United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. Gordon, 4 Cal. 368 ( 1 854). 
The California legislature responded in 1 85 5  by making it a crime for a state judge or clerk of court 
not to comply with the Federal Judiciary Act of 1 789. Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on 
1he Supreme Court, 47 AM. U.L REV. 1 6 1 ,  1 76 ( 1 9 1 3). Later, but over a strong dissenting opinion, 
the California Supreme Court acceded to the validity of the act in Ferris v. Cooper, 1 1  Cal. 1 76 
(1 858). 
136. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2 read, in part, 
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may 
be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be deter­
mined by adding to the whole Number of free persons, including t hose bound to Service for 
a Term o f  Years, excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other Persons . . .  
By the terms of the three-fifths clause, all free persons, whether Black or White, would be counted. 
Slaves, who d id not vote and who could not govern, were counted as sixty percent of a person in the 
state in which they resided for purposes of federal apportionment. The South primarily benefitted as 
the overwhelming number of slaves resided in that region of the country. In 1 790, 658 ,000 of the 
nation's 698,000 slaves resided in the South; in 1 800, 857,00 of 893,000; and in 1 8 10, 1 , 1 6 1 ,000 of 
1 , 1 9 1 ,000. DEPA RTMENT OF COM MERCE, BU REAU OF THE CENSUS,  NEGRO POPULATION, 1 790-
1 9 1 5  at 55 ( 1 9 1 8). 
1 37. REPORT OF THE HARTFORD CONVENTION, printed in T. DWIGHT, HISTORY OF THE HART­
FORD CONVENTION 3 52, 361 ( 1 833). 
1 38.  l RA C E REL. LAW REP. 479-80. See J. BANNER, JR., To THE HARTFORD CONVENTION 
( 1 970) and D. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITIC S, 1 765- 1 820, at 
278-82 ( 197 1 ). 
139 .  1 7  U. S. (4 Wheat) 3 1 6  ( 1 8 1 9). 
140. S. c. Ordinance of November 24, 1 832, reprinted in STATE PAPER S ON NU LLIFICATION 28 
( 1 854). 
1 4 1 .  Act of May 1 9 ,  1 828, ch. 55, 4 Stat. 270 ( 1 828). 
142. Act of July 1 4, 1 832, ch. 227, 4 Stat. 583 ( 1 832). 
143. L etter of Andrew Jackson to Joel R. Poinsett, December 2, 1 83 2 ,  printed in W. GOLDSMITH, 
I THE GROWT H OF PRE SIDENTIAL POWER 268, 269 ( 1 974) (hereinafter cited as PRESI DENTIAL 
POWER). l R A C E  RE L. LAW REP. 486. 
144. 1 P R E S IDENTIAL POWER, supra note 1 43, at 285. Letter of Andrew Jackson to Joel R. 
Poinsett supra note 143. Jackson was determined to end the South Carolina threat. In a letter to 
Poinsett dated December 9, 1832, Jackson boasted that if need be, he could place 100,000 armed men 
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a request to Congress for the enactment of a bill allowing him to enforce the 
federal law by use of the military as he saw fit. 145 A compromise ensued. A 
less onerous tariff passed Congress on March 2, 1 833,  146 simultaneous to the 
grant of authority Jackson sought, 1 47 and South Carolina withdrew the Stat­
ute of Nullification. 148 
In Worchester v. Georgia, 1 49 the Supreme Court in 1 832 heard the appeal 
of a conviction in the Georgia courts for failure to obtain a state license to 
enter Cherokee Indian territory, permission for which entry had already been 
granted under federal authority. The state did not appear before the Supreme 
Court to defend the conviction, its legislature having declared any attempt by 
the Supreme Court at reversal of any state conviction to be "unconstitutional 
and arbitrary," and any appearance before the Supreme Court a compromise 
to the dignity of Georgia's sovereignty. 1 50 The men convicted were released 
from state custody after the Supreme Court rejected the state's position, call­
ing it "repugnant to the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United 
States." 
1 5 1  
The intersectional battle over slavery represented the occasion for numer-
i n  South Carolina within eighty days. I PRESIDENTIAL POWER 269, 270. In a January 1 3, 1 833 
letter to Vice-President Martin Yan Buren, Jackson explained that with troops from North Carolina. 
Tennessee and the western states he could march with 40,000 men; from Pennsylvania alone he could 
depend on 50,000 men, and additionally from North Carolina he could depend on an entire regiment. 
I PRESIDENTIAL POWER 285,  286. 
145 .  I RACE REL.  LAW REP. 486. See also A. Jackson, Proclamation, December 1 0, 1 832, in 1 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER, supra note 143,  at 27 1 -85, in which Jackson stated in no uncertain terms the 
necessity and his determination to put down the nullification crisis. 
1 46. Act of March 2, 1 833,  ch. 55, 4 Stat. 629 ( 1 833).  
1 47 .  Act of March 2 ,  1 833,  ch. 57, 4 Stat. 632 ( 1 833).  
1 48 .  S. C. Ordinance of March I S, 1 83 3 ,  reprinted in STATE PAPERS, supra note 1 40, at 352. This 
was not South Carolina's first step of conciliation and/or capitulation. Within three weeks of Jack­
son's December IO proclamation, the Ways and Means Committeee of the U . S. House of Representa­
tives proposed to reduce tariffs, and on January 2 1 ,  1 833,  South Carolina suspended the nullification 
statute. c. BOUCHER, THE NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA 27 1 -275 ( 1 9 1 6) 
(reprinted 1968). S. MORRISON and H. COMMAGER, TH E  GROWTH OF THE A M ERICAN REPU BLIC 
484 ( 1 942) (hereinafter MORRISON and COMMAGER). The state was not wholly chastened by the 
episode. When the state repealed the statute of nullification, it also passed another nullifying the 
"force bil l ."  S. C. Ordinance of March 1 8, 1 833,  reprinted in STATE PAPERS at 373 . The need to test 
the new statute was not anticipated, because the state was pleased with the compromise tariff. MOR­
RISON and COMMAGER 484. 
1 49 .  3 1  U .S. (6 Pet.) 5 1 5  ( 1 832). 
1 50. 1 830 Ga. Laws 282, approved Dec. 22, 1 830. The summary of arguments by counsel at 3 1  
U.S. ( 6  Pet.)  534, 5 3 5  reveals no argument by the state of Georgia. See also 1 RACE R EL .  LA w REP. 
490. 
1 5 1 .  Worchester v, Georgia, 3 1  U.S. (6 Pet .)  at 56 1 .  Andrew Jackson then President, is reputed 
to have said of this decision, "Well, John Marshall has made his decision, �ow Jet him enforce it ." A. 
MCLAUGLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 429 ( 1 936). This statement 
may have given the state some comfort, but Jackson "did not in fact, refuse to aid in enforcing the 
Court's decision; and the charge . . .  that Jackson actually defied the Court's decrees is clearly un­
true." C. WAR REN, 1 SUPREME COURT 769. Instead, Jackson negotiated a settlement of the dispute 
underlying the case, o
_
btammg
_ 
the release of the men who had been imprisoned for failure to obtain 
the 
_
state license, and m so domg secured the support of Georgia in the South Carolina nullification 
cns1s. R . . RF.MINI, ANDREW JACKSON 1 29-40 ( 1 966). Georgia Resolution of November 29. 1 832. 
reprinted �n STATE PAPERS 27 1 .  See E. Miles, Afier John Marshall 's Decision: Worchester v. Georgia 
a11d the :\ ul/ificatJOll Crms, 39
_ 
JOURNAi.  OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 539 ( 1 973).  This did not resolve 
the state s recalcitrance on the issue of the authority of the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1 854, the Georgia 
Supreme Court 
_
considered I tself "co-equal and co-ordinate with the Supreme Court of the United 
States, and not mfenor and subordinate to that Court ."  Padelford, Fay & Co. v. Mayor and Alder­
men of Savannah. 14 Ga. 438, 506 ( 1 854). 
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ous conflicts between the authorities of free states and the federal govern­
ment, 1 52 which, under the Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution and the 
acts passed by Congress to enforce it, had a position on this matter in line with 
that of the Southern states. 1 5 ·� By and large, Northern judges respected the 
supremacy of the federal government, even when they engaged in legal gym­
nastics to maintain the freedom of those who might otherwise be slaves. 1 54 
But Ableman v. Booth , 1 5 5 a case decided by the S upreme Court in 1 8 59, 
represents an instance in which t he Wisconsin Supreme Cou rt,  because of the 
political natu re of a case dealing with slavery, did not so respect the federal 
perogative, releasing by writ of h abeas corpus a federal p risoner accused of 
illegally freei ng from federal custody a fugitive slave. The Wisconsin court 
directed its clerk of court to make no return to the writ of error to the United 
States Supreme Court. 1 56 Writ ing for the Court, Chief Justice Roger Taney 
rejected the Wisconsin court's position, stressing the need for one final voice to 
decide all federal issues. The Wisconsin legislature nonetheless passed a reso­
lution questioning the need for a supreme judicial voice when the nation was 
constituted as a union of separate sovereigns. 1 57 The reaction in other North­
ern states to this resolution was approval for the position of Wisconsin. 158 By 
contrast, in t h e  slave South there was approval for Justice Taney's position 
and criticism for that of Wisconsin .  1 59 
The i rony of Abelman v. Booth is that commentators in slave states such 
as Virginia and Georgia, states which had previously taken strong stands in 
favor of interposition, were now applauding the rejection of this doctrine. 1 60 
This irony suggests that positions on interposition develop and change in ac­
cordance with whose ox is being gored and whether the pain involved is per-
152. See P. F I N K ELMAN, AN I M PERFECT UNION ( 1 98 1); R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED ( 1 975). 
153. D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE 36-47 ( 1 978). 
154. R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 1 52, at 159- 1 9 1 .  
155. 62 U.S.  (2 1 How.) 479 ( 1 856). See T .  MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY 
LAWS OF THE NORTH, 1 780- 1 86 1 ,  at 1 73 - 1 80 (1974) (hereinafter cited as FREE MEN ALL) for a 
discusssion of this  case. 
156. 62 U . S .  (2 1 How.) at 5 12. 
157. 1 8 59 Wis. Laws Joint Resolution IV, p. 247, March 1 9, 1 859. 
158. See MORR IS, supra note 1 55, at 1 86-1 99. 
1 59. Id. at 1 99-20 1 ,  203-204. See also I RACE REL LAW REP. 495; and note 1 57, infra. 
160. Consider the views of Robert Toombs, Senator from Georgia: 
On January 24, 1 860, Senator . . .  Toombs . . . launched a vitriolic attack on the 
legislation of the free states and on the recent efforts to obtain laws preventing slave-hunt­
ing. On t h e  floor of the United States Senate he taunted the "Black Republicans" who 
"mock at constitutional obligations, jeer at oaths." In every state where they held power 
the Fugitive State Law was a dead letter. It had been nullified, he explained in a later 
speech, by "higher-law" teachings, acts passed under the fraudulent pretense of preventing 
kidnapping, and "new constructions" such as with the writ of habeas corpus. He was indig­
nant partic u larly about the judgments of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and the effort to 
obtain a new Personal Liberty Law i n  New York. Wisconsin, said Toombs, "who got rot­
ten before she got ripe, comes to us even in the first few years of her admission, with her 
hands all smeared with the blood of a violated Constitution, all polluted with perjury." The 
law introd uced in New York exceeded those in other states "in iniquity, in plain, open, 
shameless, and profligate perfidy." 
�REE MEN ALL, supra note 1 55, at 1 99-200 (footnotes deleted). William Smith, representing Virginia 
In the House of Representatives, called for a special House committee to be instructed to consider the 
policy of expelling from the union of states any state "which shall, by her legislation, aim to nullify an 
act of Congress." CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong. 2d Sess., Dec. 17, 1 8 60, 1 07 quoted in FREE MEN ALL, 
supra note 1 5 1 ,  at 203, 204. 
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ceived to be acceptable. 16 1 This suggestion explains the will ingness of those 
same states who applauded Ableman v. Booth barely a year later to engage in 
secession, the ultimate act of interposition .  
In the Civil War that followed, secession was crushed. By implication, 
interposition was rejected, both constitutionally and in terms of national poli­
tics. As one Georgia court stated in 1 890, "(a]fter the State has yielded to the 
federal army, it can well afford to yield to the federal judiciary . . . . " 1 62 The 
stand of interpositon by Orval Faubus and the Arkansas legislat ure was thusly 
based on grounds other than the thorough l y  reprobated doctrine of interposi­
tion. Like the call to localism itself, the A rkansas claim to interposition stands 
as misplaced, and in the end hypocritical and self-serving. 
IV. AFTERMATH: TH E AVOIDANCE OF ANARC H Y  
A. Cooper v. Aaron 
By the end of the 1957-58 school year, Little Rock's Cent ral High School 
had seen not only the appearance of nine Black children on a previously all­
White campus, but also regular army troops, National Guardsmen, shouting 
crowds, and scores of news personnel. The school had become the center of 
national attention, and what the nation saw was "chaos, bedlam and tur­
moil. "163 There had been "repeated incid ents of more or less serious violence 
directed against Negro students and their property, " 1 64 the entire educational 
program had been compromised by "tension and unrest, " 1 6 5 and in short, "the 
situation was 'intolerable.' " 1 66 
This was what the Little Rock school board perceived when it petitioned 
the federal district court in February 1 9 5 8  to postpone for two and one-half 
years the desegregation of Central High School. The board's position was that 
"because of extreme public hostility, . . .  engendered largely by the official 
attitudes and actions of the Governor and the legislature, the maintenance of a 
sound educational program at Central High School, with the Negro students 
in attendance, would be impossible. " 1 67 In June the district court ruled in the 
school board's favor, and after the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court in 
mid-August, the school board appealed to the Supreme Court. 1 68 In a fast 
paced and highly unusual series of moves, the Supreme Court set September 
8th as the day on or  before which a petition for certiorari might be filed. 1 69 It 
set September 1 1th as the date for argument, decided the case per curiam on 
September 12th, 1 '0 and released an extended opinion on the m atter on Sep­
tember 29, 1 958, under the names of each of the nine justices. 1 7 1  
1
.
6 1 .  _This sug�estion _is made further by James Madison's stand as President of the United States a_gamst mterpo_s1t1on dunng _the Pennsylvania rebellion as opposed to his stand in its favor during the time of the Ahen and Sed1t1on Acts. See, supra note 1 20 and text at n. 1 1 8 and 1 26- 1 3 1 .  1 62. Wrought Iron Fence Co. v. Johnson, 8� Ga. 754, 759, I I  S.E. 233, 235 ( 1 890). 1 63. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. at 13 (quoting the district court t 163 F s 20-26) 1 64. Id. a · upp. · 
1 65.  Id. 
1 66. Id. 
1 67. Id. at 10. 
168. Id. at 1 3- 14. 
1 69. Id. at 14. 
1 70. Id. See also 358 U.S. at 5. 
1 7 1 .  358 U.S. I ( 1958). 
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In the September 29th opinion, under the name Cooper v. Aaron , the 
Supreme Court emphasized two m ain points. The first was that the implemen­
tation formula of Brown II, w hile it did not necessarily call for immediate 
and/or total desegregation in every circumstance, would not countenance de­
lay on the b asis of opposition engendered, allowed, implemented, and incited 
by state officials: 1 72 
[I]n many locations, obedience to the duty of desegregation would require 
the immediate general admission of Negro children, otherwise q ualified as 
studen ts  for their appropriate classes, at particular schools. On other hand, 
a District Court, after analysis of the relevant factors (which, of course, ex­
cludes hostility to racial desegregation), might conclude that justification ex­
isted for not requiring the present nonsegregated admission of all qualified 
Negro children. . . .  the courts should scrutinize the program of the school 
authorities to make sure that t hey had developed arrangements pointed to­
ward t h e  earliest practicable completion of desegregation, and had taken ap­
propriate steps to put their p rogram into effective operation . . . .  only a 
prompt start, diligently and earnestly pursued, to eliminate racial se�rega­
tion from the public schools could constitute good fait h  compliance. 1 3 
Thus, three years after Brown II, the Supreme Court recognized the obstruc­
tionist gloss that might be put o n  Brown II and sought t o  overcome that inter­
pretation. Whatever the compromise intended by the words "all deliberate 
speed," the Supreme Court served notice in Cooper v. Aaron that it intended 
no equivocation about the message of Brown I. 
The Supreme Court emphasized also that Brown I had been reached by a 
unanimous court after "the most serious consideration , "  and even with the 
advent of three new justices replacing members of the Brown I court, the 
Supreme Court was yet unanimous in reaffirming Brown J. 1 74 With this em­
phasis, the Supreme Court reach ed toward its second m ai n  point in Cooper v. 
Aaron . No matter how distasteful, Brown l 's stricture that "separate facilities 
. . . are i n herently unequal"175 was not simply an unpalatable demand of the 
Supreme Court to be ignored by states at their pleasure and for the false pro­
tection of their citizens. It was i nstead part of the "supreme law of the land," 
binding under the supremacy clause not only on the federal government but 
on the states as well .  176 
The Supreme Court found a firm basis for this second point in as funda­
mental an opinion as Marbury v. Madison, wherein "Chief Justice Marshall, 
speaking for a unanimous court, referr(ed] to the Constitution as 'the funda­
mental and paramount law of the nation,' declar(ing] also that 'It is emphati­
cally the province and duty of the judical department to say what the law 
is.' " 1 77 The Court also found s upport even in the words of Chief Justice Ta­
ney, a defender of the law of White supremacy, 1 78 when he wrote in Ableman 
1 72. ld. a t 6-7. 
1 73 .  Id. at  7 .  
1 74. Id. a t  1 9. 
17 5. Brown I, supra note 6, at 494. 
1 76. Cooper v .  Aaron, 358 U.S. at 1 8 . 
1 77. Id. (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 1 37, 177 ( 1 803)). 
178 . Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court in Dred Scot/ v. Sanford, 60 
U.S. ( 1 9  How.) 393 ( 1 856), which concluded that blacks "are not included and were not intended to 
be included ,  under the word 'citizens' in t h e  Constitution, and therefore claim none of the rights and 
privileges w h ich that instrument provides for and secures to the citizens of the United States." Id. at 
404. Historically, and by implication at the time of the decision, Blacks were "regarded as beings of 
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v. Booth that the supremacy of the federal government as stipulated in the 
Constitution "reflected the framers 'anxiety to preserve it in full force, in all its 
powers, and to guard against resistance to or evasion of its authority, on the 
part of a State.' " 1 79 As Chief Justice Marshal � put it in United States v. Peters, 
and as the Court in Cooper v. Aaron quoted with approval, ' 'If the legislatures 
of the several states may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the 
United States, and destroy the rights acqui red under those judgments, the con-
. . . If b 1 k " I XO stitut1on itse ecomes a so emn moc ery . . . . 
Thus, this second point by the Supreme Court, that its interpretation of 
the Constitution is supreme law, was meant to hopefully lay to final rest the 
moribund but undead doctrine of interposition. By exposing to  the light of 
constitutional scrutiny the strategy of state officials in Arkansas, the Court 
hoped to ease the course of desegregation th roughout the South, and not inci­
dentally reiterate what Marbury v. Madison made clear a century and a half 
earlier, the duty of all to follow the law as established by the federal judiciary, 
in general, and the Supreme Court, in particular. 
B. A Cautionary Note 
The events which led to Cooper v. A a ron sound a cautionary note about 
the anarchy which can ensue when federal a uthority is treated by the states as 
less than what the supremacy clause says, "the supreme Law o f  the Land."18 1  
That is an anarchy that Attorney General Edwin Meese III then invited in his 
October 2 1 ,  1986 speech at Tulane University.182 
Meese argued that Cooper v. Aaron cannot mean what i t  says, when it 
states that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution is the 
supreme law of the land. 1 83 If the Coope r  v. Aaron court were right, Meese 
argues, then each decision by the Supreme Court would be i mmutably fixed 
for all time. Plessy v. Ferguson, for example, could not have been overruled by 
Brown 1. 1 84 Batson v. Kentucky, 1 85 which guaranteed for each individal de­
fendant the right to  be free from racial discrimination in petit jury selection by 
allowing proof of discrimination in each case, could not have overruled Swain 
v. A lakama. 186 whic
� 
made "peremptory challenges to persons o n  the basis of 
race virtually unrev1ewable under the Constitution."187 And the position of Abraham Lincoln that the Dred Scott 1 88 decision was unconstitutional would 
be just as wrong as Lincoln presumed Dred Scott to have been decided 
incorrectly.189 
an inferior order . . . so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect. . . .  " Id. at 407. 
1 79. Cooper v: Aaron, 3 5 8  U.S. at 18 (quoting A belman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 524 ( 1 859)). 1 80. Id. (quotmg Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 1 1 5 ,  136 ( 1809)). 
1 8 1 .  U.S. CONST., art . vi, cl. 2. 
1 82. Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REv. 979 (1987) (h · fit · t  d as Meese). 1 83. Id. at 986. erema er c1 e 
1 84. Id. at 983. 
1 85. 476 U.S. 79 ( 1 9 86). 
1 86. 380 U.S. 202 ( 1 965). 
1 87. Meese, supra note 1 82, at 983. 
1 88. Dred Scott v .  Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 Haw.) 393 ( 1 856). 
1 89. Meese, supra note 1 82, at 984, 985. Attorney General Meese h h I s Th as not c osen these exarnp e by happenstance. ey are meant to tug at our sense of racial equity t . . d manipulate his audience toward his position. This is a cheap shot on
' 
M
o em?tionally predi�pose an
b eese s part . Conspicuous Y 
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Professor Neuborne has summarized the Meese position better than 
Meese has put it himself: 
The Attorney General and his executive branch predecessors derive the 
executive's asserted legal right to "nonacquiesce" in settled judicial prece­
dent from a rigid reading of Marbury v. Madison. In Marbury, Chief Justice 
Marshall justified the judiciary's power over both Congress and the Presi­
dent as a necessary incident to the process of resolving a pending judicial 
proceeding. According to Marshall, judicial review is merely the ex necessi­
tate selection by a judge of a governing rule of law from among the compet­
ing candidates put forth by the parties. Even if Marbury establishes that such 
an ex necissitate selection is valid within the confines of the judicial branch, 
why, the Attorney General asks, should it have self-executing impact on the 
future activities of the executive branch as they affect non-parties? While 
doctrines of stare decisis or preclusion will often make the outcome of future 
judicial proceedings involving the same issues highly predictable, the Attor­
ney General argues that strict adherence to Marshall's analysis in Marbury 
entitles the executive branch to adhere to its view of the governing law at the 
administrative level unless and until the matter once again reaches the 
courts, where the judiciary decides the issue. Of course, given the predict­
ability of the ultimate judicial outcome, the executive might, as a matter of 
respect, prudence, or real politik, elect to recede voluntarily from its legal 
position, but according to the Attorney General's theory, the executive is 
under no legal obligation to do so. 1 90 
This position of Attorney General Meese is not inherently unreasona­
ble, ' 'll but it is dangerous. If the Supreme Court is not the final arbiter of the 
Constitution, then each branch of the federal government under the Meese 
theory of authoritativeness can act alone and at odds with the other. This idea 
?f a  "cacaphonous constitution" lacks the virtues of clarity, finality, practical­
ity, and the capability of guidance. 1 92 Only if one locks the Constitution into 
its absence from Meese's speech and even the footnoted publication is any reference to other decisions 
havmg nothing to do with race in which the Supreme Court has overruled itself on constitutional 
issues. See, e.g. , Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 ( 1 985) (over­
rul ing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 ( 1976)); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 
( 1 969), (overruling Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 ( 1 927)); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 1 86 ( 1 962), 
(effectively overruling Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 ( 1946)); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 ( 1 96 1), 
(overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 ( 1 949)); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 3 1 9  
U.S. 624 ( 1 943), (overruling Minersville School Dist. v .  Gobitis, 3 10 U.S. 586 ( 1 940)); and Erie R . R. 
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.  64 ( 1 938) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 4 1  U.S. ( 1 6  Pet.) I ( 1 842)). 
1 90. Neuborne. The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 61 TUL. L. REV. 99 1 ,  993-94 
( 1 987). 
1 9 1 .  See, e.g. , Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This Time?, 243 THE NATION 689 ( 1 986), re­
printed in 6 1  TuL. L. REV. 1 07 1  ( 1 987); Tush net, The Supreme Court, the Supreme Law of the Land, 
and A ttorney General Meese: A Comment, 6 1  TuL. L. REV. 1 0 1 7  ( 1 987); Colby, Two Views on the 
Legitimacy of Nonacquiescence in Judicial Opinions, 6 1  TUL. L. REV. 104 1  ( 1 987). 
192. Neuborne, supra note 1 90, at 994. The troublesome nature of a constitution without a si!'1gle 
authoritative voice to construe it is not merely recently considered. In Ferris v. Cooper, the Califor­
nia Supreme Court declared: 
That there should be a central tribunal, having power to give authoritative exposition to the 
Constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, and which should also possess the 
power to se�ure every
' 
citizen the rights to which he is entitled under .them, seems to us highly expedient. The value of uniformity of decisions wher� t_
he Const1tut1on and 1.aws of 
the Federal Government are to be expounded in cases of md1v1dual nghts, and the impor­
tance of the principle that every citizen of the United States know th.
e extent, and be pro­
tected by a tribunal of the highest authority and free from loca� prejudices or pa.
ss1ons m the 
enjoyment of all the rights, exemptions, and privileges with which the Const1tut1on and laws 
of the Union invest him, cannot easily be exaggerated. Indeed, m order to render the Con­
stitution and laws of the Federal Government the same things to the people of the Uni ted 
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the jurisprudence of original intention does the Meese position on authorita­
tiveness bear virtue, and then only because the Constitution is thought not to 
be a living document but instead shackled by the perceptions and limitations 
of its framers and the framers' times. By contrast, a Constitution not so 
shackled is susceptible of different readings over time, in accordance with 
changing levels of sophistication and sensibilities. Under such a n  interpreta­
tion of the Constitution, Lincoln might well argue for a change in the under­
standing of the law o f  the Constitution underlying the Dred Scott case, and 
Brown I might legitimately overrule Plessy v. Ferguson, all without undermin­
ing the authoritative nature of Supreme Court pronouncements. 
The opposite tack which Attorney General Meese has taken ignores the 
danger that underlies Cooper v. Aaron, the very case whose statement respect­
ing authoritativeness of Supreme Court pronouncements Meese seeks to ques­
tion. If the Supreme Court is not the final arbiter of constitutional law, then 
the inference may be had that anyone can be an authoritative arbiter of the 
Constitution, the position of the Supreme Court notwithstanding. Meese's po­
sition gives comfort t o  those who would revive the corpse of interposition, and 
that specter is an ugly one, as demonstrated by the Little Rock c risis. Out of 
this crisis a caution is issued and a warning is sounded, one especially compel­
ling for a document over 200 years old. 
The warning is this: the Constitution must be the supreme power, and no 
local interest can be allowed to predominate over its mandate, no matter how 
important the local interest nor how stubborn its supporters. For there is no 
power in a law that is not obeyed, and n o  beauty in a Constitution whose 
power dissipates even as it is spoken. 
States, it is necessary that they receive their ultimate construction from the same tribunal; 
for there is but little practical difference between two or more different Constitutions and 
one Constitution variously and differently construed. 
1 1  Cal. at 1 80. See also United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 1 1 5, at 1 3 5-36; Cohens v. Virginia, 
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 385 ( 1 82 1 ); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (2 1 Haw.) 506, at 5 1 4- 1 6  (1 858). 
